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MALPRACTICE-VOLUNTARY STERILIZATION-PUBLIC POLICY
DOES NOT RENDER PHYSICIAIN IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY FOR
CHILD'S UPBRINGING SUBSEQUENT TO UNSUCCESSFUL STERILI-
ZATION, Custodio v. Bauer (Cal. App. 1967).
In November 1963, upon medical advice that the birth of future
children would be injurious to her health, Mrs. Custodio-together
with her husband-contracted with three physicians, who agreed to
perform a sterilization operation. A year following the operation, the
Custodios, who had relied on the doctors' opinion that they could
resume sexual relations, found themselves faced with the prospect
of the birth of another child. On January 20, 1965, Mr. and Mrs.
Custodio brought an action against the physicians. The complaint
alleged negligent malpractice on the part of the defendants in their
performance of the unsuccessful operation, breach of the contract to
sterilize, and misrepresentation. The plaintiffs sought damages for:
(1) the medical expenses incurred and those to be incurred in the
prenatal and postnatal care of Mrs. Custodio; (2) the pain and
suffering endured by the plaintiffs upon discovering the pregnancy;
(3) the possible aggravation of an existing kidney and bladder con-
dition which prompted the operation; (4) the expenses to be ex-
pected in the rearing of the child until the attainment of legal
majority; and (5) punitive damages incident to the allegations of
defendants' fraud and deceit. However, despite the allegations and
the prayer for relief, the trial court sustained a general demurrer on
the grounds that the plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action.
On appeal to the District Court of Appeal, held, reversed: Negli-
gence on the part of physicians can be the proximate cause of preg-
nancy; the erroneous opinion of physicians in their professional
capacity is actionable at law as misrepresentation; and damages in
contract can be established upon the showing of a breach of warranty
of operational success. Furthermore, in addition to the expenses in
delivering a child, the cost involved in a child's upbringing represents
legally cognizable damages. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Adv. Cal. App.
308, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967), rehearing denied, 251 Adv. Cal.
App. 331, 59 Cal. Rptr. 478, hearing denied, 67 Adv. Cal. 3
(Minutes).
The history of judicial authority dealing with a physician's civil
liability for an unsuccessful sterilization operation is meager. Before
1930 there appears to be no single case reported in which a patient,
who had consented to sterilization, sued his or her doctor.' Subse-
1 16 A.B.AJ. 158, 160 (1930).
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quent to that date, the few cases reported have not been uniform
either in the theory of the cause of action, or in the damages sought
by the particular plaintiff; moreover, with one exception, the public
policy questions have not been discussed with regard to recognizing
the financial burden of the child's upbringing as damages cognizable
at law.
In the first case known to have been reported, Christensen v.
Thornby,2 the plaintiff-husband consented to a sterilization operation
on the advice of his wife's doctor, who had warned that a future
pregnancy would result in injury to her. The operation was un-
successful and, thereafter, the plaintiff's wife became pregnant and
gave birth to a normal, healthy child. The complaint in Ckristensen
sounded in deceit, and recovery was sought for mental anguish, as
well as for the expenses incurred before and after the birth of the
child. Reviewing the case on appeal-from an order sustaining a
demurrer-the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that, although
a contract to perform a sterilization operation was not contrary to
public policy when based on medical necessity, the plaintiff did not
state a cause of action in deceit and did not allege a breach of con-
tract or negligent malpractice. With respect to the damages sought
by the plaintiff, the court ruled that recovery for the expenses in-
curred was not within the contemplation of the parties at the time
of the operation: the purpose of the operation was medical necessity,
not avoidance of the costs attendant to the birth of the child.'
In the 1957 decision of Shaheen v. Knight,4 a landmark in the
area of ineffective sterilization, the court held that a contract to
sterilize a man is not against public policy, and that, while a guarantee
of cure is not to be implied in every contract for medical services,
there was a sufficient basis in the pleadings to establish a warranty be-
cause of the allegation that the defendant had promised to make the
plaintiff permanently sterile. The court, however, dismissed the
complaint, deciding that the plaintiff had suffered no cognizable
damages. The holding was based in terms of public policy: to allow
damages for the birth of a child was deemed contrary to the mores of
society."
The initial recognition that damages are awardable came in West
2 192 Ainn. 123, 255 N.W; 620 (1934).
8 Id. at 126, 255 N.W. at 622.
4 11 Pa. D & C.2d 41 (C.P. 1957).
5 Id. at 45.
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v. Underwood.6 In that case, although the injury sustained was not
the unexpected birth of a child but the suffering of severe pain as a
result of improper operations and medical treatment, the court held
that whether a doctor is negligent in failing to sterilize a plaintiff
and whether this is the proximate cause of injury are questions to be
decided by a jury. Should a plaintiff be successful on these two
issues, the court said, he or she ought to be entitled to recover for all
mental and physical suffering, together with any other damages
proximately resulting from such negligence. Later in Bishop v.
Byrne,7 the West thesis of recovery was extended to the situation
where a negligently performed sterilization results in the unexpected
birth of a child. Plaintiffs, upon proper proof of their allegations for
damages, could, it was held, recover for the expenses incurred in
birth of a child and for the anguish experienced by a wife during
pregnancy.'
The damages awardable in actions sounding in contract and those
sounding in negligence have also been distinguished. In a contract
action, it has been determined that damages are restricted to hospital
expenses and do not include the pain and suffering of the plaintiff.9
As the case history well illustrates, and as the court's opinion in
Custodio v. Bauer dearly recognizes,10 the critical issue in the area
of ineffective sterilization is whether damages are in fact recoverable.
Without doubt the direction of the law is not unvarying, conse-
quently, against this background, the Custodio case appears to be of
6 132 N.J.L. 325, 40 A.2d 610 (Ct. Err. & App. 1945).
7 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W. Va. 1967).
8 Id. at 463.
In Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964), the questions of
negligent malpractice, proximate cause and alleged damages for pain and suffering of
the plaintiffs, as well as expenses incident to the unexpected child's upbringing, were
submitted to the jury, which found for the defendant-physician. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the finding by the trier of fact; however, the
court carefully avoided the policy questions raised by Shaheen by indicating that its
decision should not be interpreted as a determination of the issues as a matter of law.
Ball v. Mudge, supra at 247, 391 P.2d at 203.
) Doerr v. Villate, 74 Ill. App. 2d 332, 336-37, 220 N.E.2d 767, 769 (1966).
In Milde v. Leigh, 75 N.D. 418, 28 N.W.2d 530 (1947), the husband sought
damages for loss of consortium and for the expenses incurred for medical treatment and
care of his wife who had become pregnant following a sterilization operation. On
appeal, the court, holding that plaintiff's claim was barred by the statute of limitations,
noted that, when the wife is a victim of a tort, two causes of action arise: a cause
of action in the wife for physical injury, pain, suffering and loss of earnings; and a
cause of action in the husband for the loss of the wife's services and society, as well
as for expenses incurred for medical treatment. Id. at 427-29, 28 NW.2d at 536.
10 251 Adv. Cal. App. at 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 473,
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major significance, since it provides for a cause of action sounding in
contract, negligence and misrepresentation, and further holds that
the expenses involved in the upbringing of the child are damages
compensable at law.
In its analysis of the plaintiffs' theory as to the breach of contract,
the Custodio court, although recognizing that a doctor does not
always guarantee the success of his treatment, adjudged that a phy-
sician may be liable for a breach of warranty where there is an ex-
press contract. 1 Hence, the plaintiffs' allegation, regarding their
purpose in undergoing the operation and the promise by the doctor
to sterilize Mrs. Custodio, was sufficient to withstand the general
demurrer, nothwithstanding that the trial court must rule on the
special demurrer to ascertain the terms of the agreement.' 2
Moreover, since negligence may be pleaded generally, the court
in Custodio opined that the plaintiffs' tripartite statement of a
breach of tort duty was properly set forth in that it (1) alleged the
want of the ordinary, reasonable and prudent care required of an
average member of the medical profession; (2) averred that the
defendants were careless, following the operation, in failing to in-
form the patient of the need to practice contraception and thereby
avoid the results of an unsuccessful operation; and (3) contended
that the defendants were remiss in failing to inform Mrs. Custodio
of the alternative surgical procedures that would best accomplish
sterilization.1
3
With respect to the averment of deceit and negligent misrepre-
sentation by the defendants, the court noted that a cause of action was
supported by the allegation of the false or careless statements con-
cerning the safe resumption of marital intercourse, and the plain-
tiffs' consequent justifiable reliance.' 4
Proceeding to the defendants' contention that the damages prayed
for were not proximately caused by any breach of duty on the part
of the defendants, the court observed that the resumption of marital
relations by the plaintiffs was forseeable.' 5 The defendants were thus
not relieved of liability by an intervening act, the possible conse-
i. Id. at 320, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 471; See Miller, The Contractual Liability of Phy-
sicians and Surgeons, 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 413, 416.
12 251 Adv. Cal. App. at 320, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
13 Id. at 317-18 & nn.5, 6 & 7, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 469-70 & nn.5, 6 & 7.
'4 Id. at 319, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
15 Id. at 321-22, 59 Cal. Rptr at 472.
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quences of which sterilization was intended to eliminate. However,
it was noted that the trier of fact must decide whether the defen-
dants' negligence or the natural regeneration of the fallopian tubes
was solely or concurrently the proximate cause of the injuries al-
legedly suffered by the plaintiffs. 16
While the legal issues previously discussed were significant in
determining the sufficiency of the Custodios' cause of action, the
question as to their alleging damages cognizable at law was crucial,
since a cause of action in tort, contract, or deceit is not complete un-
less the plaintiff has suffered some wrong which a court of law deems
worthy of redress.
In evaluating the merit of plaintiffs' allegations, the Custodio court
held that at the very least the plaintiffs should be able to obtain
compensation for the cost of the operation.' Furthermore, in noting
that the complaint was filed before the birth of the child,'8 and by
relying on- West v. Underwood,'" the court stated that recovery could
be obtained upon proving either emotional suffering as a result of the
unexpected pregnancy, or anxiety due to the possible aggravation of
the expectant mother's kidney and bladder condition. Similarly, had
Mrs. Custodio been injured by the pregnancy and/or the child birth,
this circumstance would be compensable if the injuries had been for-
seeable at the time the operation was performed. Moreover, if the
experience of expecting another child were to lessen Mrs. Custodio's
ability to perform the duties of a wife and mother, this could also be
compensated by pecuniary damages. 20 Even if she had not been in-
jured by the birth of another child, the court recognized that the
addition of another dependent might require her to give less atten-
tion and care to the other members of the family, thereby giving rise
16 Id. at 322, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
The court noted Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d at 249-50, 391 P.2d at 203-04 (1964),
although the reason for the citation is not clear. The Washington State Supreme Court
held that the finding by the trier of fact, that the defendant-physician was not the
proximate cause of the damages allegedly suffered by the plaintiff, was justified in
view of the conflicting testimony as to whether post-operative checks following a
vasectomy were standard medical practice, and testimony that "a process known as
recanalization, while rare, sometimes occurs after the operation and such cannot be
prevented by the surgeon." Ball v. Mudge, supra at 249, 391 P.2d at 204. The
Custodio court apparently draws an analogy to the instant case with respect to whether
the natural regeneration of the fallopian tubes was the sole proximate cause of the
damages alleged.
-7 251 Adv. Cal. App. at 327, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
18 Id. at 327-28, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
'9 132 N.J.L. 325, 40 A.2d 610 (Ct. Err. & App. 1945).
20 251 Adv. Cal. App. at 328, 59 Cal. Rptr. at- 476.
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to damages upon a showing that this could be measured in economic
terms.21 On the other hand, if Mrs. Custodio had died in childbirth
and her death had been proximately caused by circumstances forsee-
able when the operation was undertaken, her husband and children
would have had an action for wrongful death.22
Following its discussion of the compensability of the hypothetical
injuries incident to birth, the court considered whether recovery for
the upbringing of the child was palatable. Since the Shaheen case
appeared in 1957, there has been speculation as to whether courts
in future decisions will recognize this circumstance as representing
a basis for awarding damages.23 The argument against allowing
recovery was presented in Shaheen, where the court declared that a
contract to perform a sterilization operation was not against public
policy, irrespective of whether the patient's motivation in under-
going the operation was medical or financial. In support of this
contention the court said:
It is only when a given policy is so obviously for or against the
public health, safety, morals or welfare that there is a virtual unani-
mity of opinion in regard to it that a court may constitute itself the
voice of the community in declaring such policy void . . . . 'There
must be a... universal public sentiment deeply integrated in the
customs and beliefs of the people and in their convictions of what is
just and right ... '24
However, the Shaheen court denied damages, apparently employing
the same definition of public policy by which it declared valid the
contract between the patient and physician. The reasoning of Shaheen
lies in the neutralizing effect that the joy of raising a child has on the
expense incurred therein. However, it has been pointed out that
married couples, who undergo sterilization for financial reasons, do
not share the Shaheen court's value judgment.25
If the basis of public policy is the consensus of society, and if in
society there is ingrained the concept of family planning, the accept-
ability of sterilization for financial reasons is, in those jurisdictions
21 Id. at 328-29, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
22 Id. at 328, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
The court noted that, if the pregnancy benefited Mrs. Cutodio's emotional state, this
circumstance would mitigate damages. Id.
23 See Note, Elective Sterilization, 113 U. Pa. L. REv. 415, 433-36 (1965); 19
U. Prrr. L. REv. 802-05 (1958); 9 UTAH L. REv. 808 (1965).
24 Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d at 43 (C.P. 1957).
25 Note, Elective Sterilization, supra note 23, at 435 & n.79.
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where it is not illegal,26 dearly an expression of favorable public
sentiment. Indeed, using as a criterion the definition of public policy
outlined in Shaheen, is it reasonable to argue that there is a "virtual
unanimity of opinion" against awarding damages which arise out of
a medical operation apparently sanctioned by public policy? There
is a certain illogic in the rationale of the Shaheen holding: a contract
designed to achieve a certain result is not contrary to public policy,
whereas recovery of damages arising out of a breach of that contract
is opposed to this standard, even when the plaintiff is saddled with
the exact economic burden which he sought to avoid by entering into
the agreement. 7
Although in Custodio v. Bauer2s the plaintiffs admitted undergoing
the operation for medical reasons, the California court still questioned
the logic of denying damages, as was done in Christensen, where the
motivation of the plaintiffs was also medical rather than financial. 20
It also has been suggested that recovering damages for the financial
burden of the unwanted or unexpected child should be denied be-
cause of the possibility of the unfavorable emotional reaction this
would have on the child himself.8 0 While this argument does not
appear in the case law, it was noted by the court in Custodio81 and is
based on the idea that the paramount interest of the public is the
emotional well-being of the child-a well-being that transcends
financial considerations. 2 An analogy is drawn in this argument to
the situation in which the law restrains a husband or wife from
testifying to the illegitimacy of his or her child so as to save the
child from suffering the stigma of bastardy. 3 The situation of the
unexpected child, conceived following a sterilization operation, is
28 Statutes in a few jurisdictions do not permit elective sterilization for reasons other
than medical necessity. E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 53-33 (1958).
27 Note, Elective Sterilization, supra note 23, at 435, (it is suggested here that
courts should allow recovery at least for the expense of the delivery of the child).
28 251 Adv. Cal. App. at 312-13, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
29 Id. at 329, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477 (where the court notes criticism of the refusal
of earlier cases to allow recovery for the consequences of the unsuccessful operation
that were clearly foreseeable). See Note, Elective Sterilization, supra note 23, at
435-36; 19 U. PrrT. L. REv. at 804-05. Both these articles suggest a distinction between
the holdings of Christensen and Shaheen. The holding of the former case was defended
upon the grounds that the contemplated damages did not include the financial expenses
involved in the birth of the unexpected child, where the plaintiffs agreed to the opera.
tion for medical reasons. In the latter case the court's decision was criticized for denying
damages where the plaintiffs underwent the operation for financial reasons.
so 9 UTAH L. REv. 808, 811-12 (1965).
31 251 Adv. Cal. App. at 329-30, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
32 9 UTAn L. REv. 808, 811-12 & n.22 (1965).
33 Id. at 812 (where an analogy is drawn to the practice of sealing records of
adoption proceedings and changing birth records of adopted children).
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further likened to child custody cases in which the courts have con-
sidered the emotional stability of the child before considering the
financial solvency of the person to whom custody of the child is to
be entrusted.84 The Custodio court, however, intimating that the con-
cern for the emotional damage to the child is overstated, declared:
The emotional injury to the child can be no greater than that found
in many families where "planned parenthood" has not followed the
blueprint .... 35
One cannot categorically say whether the [new] ...arrival in
the Custodio family will be more emotionally upset if he arrives
in an environment where each of the other members will have a
happier and more well-adjusted life if he brings with him the
wherewithal to make it possible.
36
The court realized that the damages are not sought for the physical
existence of the child, "but to replenish the family exchequer so that
the new arrival will not deprive the other members of the family of
what was planned as their just share of the family income."
8 7
34 Id. at 812 & n.22.
85 251 Adv. Cal. App. at 329-30, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
86 Id.
37 Id. at 329, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
The court concluded its opinion by stating that the plaintiffs to the extent that they
prove their allegations should be able to recover damages according to the principles
of tort and contract.
The Custodio court did not distinguish beween damages awardable when the plaintiff
sounds his complaint in tort or contract. Traditionally, however, the common law limits
recovery for breach of contract to those damages that are within the contemplation of
the parties. 22 Am~s. JUR. 2d Damages § 55 (1965). It seems reasonable that a plaintiff,
suing for a breach of warranty of operational success, should be able to recover damages
for pain and suffering subsequent to the discovery of the imminent birth of another
child. Nevertheless, in Doerr v. Villate, 74 Ill. App. 2d at 336-37, 220 N.E.2d at 769,
the court specifically excluded recovery of such damages. Some jurisdictions hold that,
where the contract is personal in nature, recovery for mental anguish is considered to
have been within the contemplation of the parties. See Lamm v. Shingelton, 231 N.C. 10,
14-15, 55 S.E.2d 810, 812-13 (1949) (a plaintiff widow was awarded damages for
mental distress arising out of a breach of warranty in the sale of a burial vault);
accord, Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 468-72, 84 N.W.2d 816, 823-25 (1957)
(plaintiff-wife recovered damages for mental distress when her child was stillborn as a
result of the physician's failure to perform a Caesarian operation as stipulated by
contract).
As to the question of recovery for expenses involved in the upbringing of the child,
the court in Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. at 126, 255 N.W. at 622, denied
recovery on the grounds that such damages were not within the contemplation of the
parties. In Doerr, the court stated recovery could be had for all damages normally
arising from the breach. The question is whether the expenses involved in the up-
bringing of a child would come under this rule. Thus, in some jurisdictions it may
make a substantial difference in the amount of recovery whether the plaintiff grounds
his complaint in tort or contract.
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Custodio v. Bauer is a case of first impression in California re-
garding the public policy questions inherent in a physician's civil
liability for the performance of an unsuccessful sterilization; 8 in
addition, the decision is a landmark by virtue of its extensive discus-
sion of the recovery of damages. This discussion may be divided into
two parts. In the first instance, the case represents the broadest
application of the doctrine of West v. Underwood to the various
hypothetical situations which may give rise to recovery for damages
incident to the birth of a child. Furthermore, Custodio is the first
judicial opinion which indicates that the costs of the rearing of a child
are legally cognizable damages. Implicit in this ruling is the recog-
nition of the cardinal legal principle that, in a civil suit, the defendant
should be liable for the injuries sustained as a result of his breach
of duty. 9
On occasion this principle is overcome by reason of some over-
riding public policy or paramount social interest. In certain situations,
courts have found that to subject a particular defendant to civil
38 Id. at 322, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 472 the Custodio court cited only three California cases
dealing with sterilization. Two of these cases do not deal with the same factual
situation of the instant case: Kritzer v. Citron, 101 Cal. App. 2d 33, 224 P.2d 808
(1950) (sterilization of the wife where there was no consent); Wiley v. Wiley, 59
Cal. App. 2d 840, 842; 139 P.2d 950, 951 (1943) (annulment sought by the husband
was not defeated because he submitted to a sterilization on the representation of his
wife that it was for medical reasons).
In Bathke v. Rahn, 46 Cal. App. 2d 694, 696, 116 P.2d 640-41 (1941), the husband
brought a malpractice action for an alleged negligently performed double vasectomy,
which the defendant-physician warranted would prevent future pregnancy of his wife,
and would not "impair the ability of plaintiff to follow his occupation of travelling
salesman." The plaintiff did not pray for damages covering the cost of the child's up.
bringing. Following the trial court's granting of a general demurrer on the grounds
that his claim was barred by the statute of limitations, the plaintiff appealed, relying
on the principle that where a cause of action is fraudulently concealed by the wrong-
doer, the statutory period is interrupted until plaintiff's discovery of the injury. In
affirming the lower court's judgment, the District Court of Appeal said: "Were the
allegations on [fraudulent concealment] . . . limited to the warranty of sterility,
plaintiff's reliance thereon and the subsequent pregnancy of the wife, the complaint
would seem to fall within the rule announced .... But the complaint is not so limited."
Id. at 696, 116 P.2d at 641. Noting that the plaintiff also alleged suffering a nervous
disorder, the court held that the fraudulent concealment doctrine was not applicable in
this instance as a defense to the statute of limitations. Id.
The plaintiffs in Custodio argued that the language of the opinion in Bathke,
quoted above, indicated that if there had been no allegation of a nervous disorder, the
complaint would have stated a valid cause of action. Hence, by way of dicta, the Bathke
court, the plaintiffs argued, acknowledged a cause of action for damages resulting from
malpractice in a sterilization operation and that this claim was not barred by public
policy. Brief for Appellants at 5, Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Adv. Cal. App. 308, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 463 (1967). However, the Custodio court did not use Bathke as authority for
sustaining the plaintiffs' cause of action.
89 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.1 (1956).
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liability for certain acts may be unjust or socially or economically
inexpedient. Hence, in these situations the defendant is deemed
immune from certain consequences of his actions which would other-
wise give rise to a cause of action for damages in favor of the in-
jured party. Since this results in an injured plaintiff's being foreclosed
from obtaining pecuniary compensation, the courts do not, and should
not, reach this conclusion without a careful weighing of the various
social interests affected. It is this problem-the balancing of the
public interest versus the interest of certain private parties-which is
the legal battleground on which Shaheen and Custodio were decided.
The California District Court of Appeal concluded that recovery
for the cost of the unexpected child's upbringing would relieve the
imminent financial burden thrust upon the parents and, in addition,
would neither do violence to the institutions of family and marriage
nor seriously endanger the child's emotional well-being. Professor
William L. Prosser has observed that, while "[t]he shadow of
history lies heavily on the law... ," social ideas inevitably adapt to
new and different problems of a changing society.40 Custodio v. Bauer
has recognized the significance of a sterilization operation as one
means of implementing the concept of family planning in the
twentieth century; furthermore, it has determined that there are no
cogent public policy reasons why a physician should not be liable to
his patient for all damages arising from the unexpected birth of a
child following a sterilization where there has been proof of a
breach of contract, negligent malpractice or deceit.
DANIEL M. HORWICK
40 W. PROSSER TORTS § 4 (3d ed. 1964).
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